Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1988

Cadillacs, Gold Watches, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The
Continuing Evolution of the Tax Treatment of Gifts to Employees
Mark W. Cochran
St. Mary's University School of Law, mcochran@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles

Recommended Citation
Mark W. Cochran, Cadillacs, Gold Watches, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Continuing Evolution of
the Tax Treatment of Gifts to Employees, 5 Akron Tax J. 27 (1988).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

CADILLACS, GOLD WATCHES, AND THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986: THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF THE TAX
TREATMENT OF GIFTS TO EMPLOYEES
by
MARK W. COCHRAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Tax Reform Act of 19861 added three new Internal Revenue Code provisions applicable to "gifts" from employers to employees. New I.R.C. Section 102(c) 2 sets forth a general rule that property transferred by an employer

to an employee shall not be excluded from the employee's gross income as a
gift? A new exclusion for certain employee awards appears in Section 74(c). 4
The exclusion is keyed to Section 274(j), a new provision limiting an employer's
deductions for such awards.5 These three provisions should mark the end, or
at least the beginning of the end, of many years of uncertainty for taxpayers
and inconsistency on the part of the courts, the Congress, and the Commissioner. At the same time, the new provisions, like any new legislation, give
rise to new uncertainties. 6

The purpose of this article is to explore the historical background underlying
the 1986 changes 7 to explain the changes,8 and to assess their meaning and
significance?
II. THE DUBERsTEiN OPINION
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 10 decided in 1960, is generally regarded as

the watershed case on the question of when, if ever, a gratuitous transfer in
a business context is a gift and thus excludable from gross income under Section 102. In Duberstein, the Supreme Court stated that the word "gift," as it
is used in Section 102, means a transfer that "proceeds from a 'detached and
disinterested generosity'

. .

. 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or

* Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas.

IPub. L. No. 99-514, hereinafter referred to as "the Act."
Act section 122.
3
See infra notes 385-96 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 373-80 and accompanying text.
2

5

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 385-406.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 10-352.
6

8

See infra text accompanying notes 353-84.
See infra text accompanying notes 385-418.
-0363 U.S. 278 (1960).

9
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like impulses."' (Citations Omitted).' 1 Whether a particular transfer is a gift,
2
the Court held, is a question of fact to be decided on a case by case basis.'
In Duberstein, the taxpayer had received a Cadillac from a business associate
as a token of the associate's appreciation for profitable business referrals Mr.
Duberstein had provided.' 3 The associate was under no obligation to compensate Mr. Duberstein for the referrals, but apparently he thought the gift was
prudent from a business standpoint. 4 The Tax Court determined, as a factual
matter, that the transfer was intended as compensation and, therefore, was not
a gift for purposes of section 102.15 The Court of Appeals reversed.16 The
Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals should not have reversed
the Tax Court's factual conclusion because that conclusion was not "clearly
erroneous." 17 Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
18
decision and allowed the Tax Court's decision to stand.
Stanton v. United States, a companion case to Duberstein, involved payments
by an employer to a departing employee. The taxpayer had resigned his job
under circumstances that appeared to be acrimonious. 9 The employer's board
of directors voted to pay Mr. Stanton a "gratuity" of $20,000, on the condition
that Mr. Stanton release any claim against the employer for pension or retirement benefits.20 In fact, Mr. Stanton was not entitled to any such benefits.2
Without elaboration, the trial court held that the payment was a gift and as
such was excluded from Mr. Stanton's gross income by section 102.22 The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that Mr. Stanton had failed to demonstrate that
the payment was anything other than compensation for services.23 The Supreme
Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision, stating that the conclusory nature
of the trial court's opinion made it impossible to determine whether its findings of fact were clearly erroneous. 4 The Court remanded the case to the District
Court for more detailed findings2 5
"Id. at 285.
12d. at 290.
"Id. at 280.

14 1d. at 281. The donor deducted the value of the Cadillac as a business expense.
"Duberstein v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (P-H) 58-13 (1958).
16 Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959).
"1 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 291.
'11d. at 293.
19 The taxpayer apparently had objected to the firing of a colleague. 363 U.S. at 282-83.
20

d.

21 Id.

22 See 363 U.S. at 292, n.14, citing the oral findings of the district court.
23268 E.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959).
24363 U.S. at 292.

211d. On remand, the district court recited the same facts and held that the payment was a non-taxable
gift. 186 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). The district court concluded that the payment was motivated
by "good will, esteem, and kindliness ...

and ...

a deep sense of appreciation for (the taxpayer's ser-
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Rather than setting forth specific criteria for determining whether a transfer
is a gift, the Supreme Court in Duberstein stated that "(d)ecision of the issue
...must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's
experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts
of each case." 26 The Court did, however, articulate a definition of what is and
is not a gift, drawing from language in earlier cases. The Court pointed out
that a mere absence of a legal or moral obligation does not make a transfer
a gift for purposes of Section 102.27 Thus, a transfer can be a gift in the common law sense but still not qualify for exclusion from the recipient's gross income. 8 In order to be a gift for purposes of Section 102, the donor must make
the gift out of "detached and disinterested generosity." 29 Conversely, a transfer
is not a gift if the donor is motivated by "'the constraining force of any moral
or legal duty' or from 'the incentive of anticipated benefit of an economic
nature.' "30 The Court specifically stated that "[w]here the payment is in return
for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit
from it." 3
The Court declined to adopt a "test" proposed by the Commissioner that "(g)ifts should be defined as transfers of property made for personal as
distinguished from business reasons" 3 2 - stating that to adopt such a test "would
be painting on a large canvas with indeed a broad brush." 3 3 In support of the
proposed test, the Commissioner advanced various propositions, including the
propositions that "payments by an employer to an employee, even though voluntary, ought, by and large, to be taxable" and "that the concept of a gift is inconsistent with a payment's being . ., a deductible business expense." 34 In
rejecting the proposed test, the Court observed, perhaps significantly,35 that
"it doubtless is, statistically speaking, the exceptional payment by an employer
to an employee that amounts to a gift," 36 and that "it is doubtless relevant to
the over-all inference [of whether a transfer is a gift] that the transferor treats
37
a payment as a business deduction."
vices)." 186 F Supp. at 397. It would seem that the latter motivation militates against gift treatment under
the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
26
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289.
27d. at 285, quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929).
28363 U.S. at 285.
29

1d., quoting Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 46 (1956).

30363 U.S. at 285, quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).

31363 U.S. at 285, quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1951).
32363 U.S. at 284, n.6.
33id. at 287.
34Id.

31See infra text accompanying notes 418-19.
36363 U.S. at 387.
37Id.
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DUBERSTEIN IN THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE CONTEXT

It is not surprising that controversies have arisen over whether transfers
from employers to employees constitute gifts for purposes of Section 102. As
the Supreme Court stated in Duberstein38 and earlier cases, 39 a gift is a transfer
out of "detached and disinterested generosity." 40 Conversely, if the donor is
motivated by something other than generosity, the transfer is not a gift 4 In
the employer-employee context, motives other than generosity are almost always
present. When an employer makes a purported gift to an employee, the most
obvious inference is that the employee is being compensated for services
rendered. Clearly, such compensation is not a gift 4 2 There are, however, other
possible motives besides a desire to compensate the employee. Often, the transfer
might be made for the purpose of establishing or enhancing good will on the
part of an individual employee,43 employees as a group,44 or the general public 5
While the employer's desire to enhance good will can be distinguished from
the more basic intention to compensate an employee, it cannot accurately be
46
labeled "detached and disinterested generosity."
Presumably, it was the almost universal presence of motives other than
generosity that prompted the government to assert in Duberstein that payments
by an employer to an employee "ought, by and large, to be taxable." 47 While
the Supreme Court declined to accept the proposition as a basis for deciding
the status of a payment, the opinion does concede that a true gift from an
8
employer to an employee is a rare occurrence
When a donor is motivated in part by generosity and in part by a wish
to compensate the recipient for services or a desire to promote business good
will, does the existence of any motivation besides generosity taint the gift? The
Dubersteinopinion appears to say not. The Court states that in order to determine whether a transfer is a gift, one must look to "the basic reason for [the
donor's] conduct ... the dominant reason that explains his action in making
the transfer." (Emphasis added):9 The clear implication is that motives other

than generosity do not preclude gift treatment, so long as generosity is the "dominant" motive. 0
3X363 U.S. 278, (1960).
39

See supra notes 27-31.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
41
1d. See supra text accompanying note 30.
40

42

1d. See supra text accompanying note 31.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17, infra note 62.
44See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 53-131, 1953-2 C.B. 112, infra note 67.
45
Id.
46Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285. See also infra notes 72-76.
47
d. See also text accompanying note 34.
411d. at 287. See also supra text accompanying note 36.
49/d. at 286.
50
See Willis and Hawley, 1.R.C. Section 274(b) and Duberstein Resurface: The Emperor Still Has No Clothes,
43
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Employers normally deduct payments to employees as ordinary and

necessary business expenses. 5' "Gifts" made for the purpose of compensating
employees clearly are deductible by the employer.52 Gifts made for the more
generalized purpose of establishing or enhancing good will are also deductible, as they are directly related to the employer's business. 53 Payments arising
purely out of generosity, on the other hand, presumably would be nondeductible personal expenses.5 4 Based on these factors, the government suggested in

Duberstein that, by definition, an item that is deductible by the donor as a
business expense cannot be a gift in the hands of the recipient. 5 This assertion
seems particularly persuasive in view of the Court's approach to mixed motive
gifts - i.e. that the dominant motive controls.56 When a business expense is
incurred partly for personal reasons, the usual approach in determining deductibility is to look to the primary purpose for incurring the expense.5 7 In fact,
this approach has been applied in determining whether an employer can deduct the cost of gifts to employees 5 8 Thus, the employer's tax treatment would
appear to be a convenient and logical means for determining the employer's

dominant motivation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that
the donor's deduction of the cost of a gift is relevant in determining his motiva59
tion, declined to treat it as controlling.
The constant presence of motives other than pure generosity, along with
the apparent logical inconsistency between deduction by the donor and exclu-

sion by the donee, has given rise to numerous cases and rulings involving "gifts"
to employees. A sampling of these cases and rulings appears below, grouped
into five categories: holiday gifts, employer charity, payments to surviving
spouses of deceased employees, retirement payments, and bonuses.

25 ARIZ. L. REV. 907 (1983). The authors criticize the "dominant motive" test of Duberstein as a misreading
of Bogardus and suggest an alternative approach of apportioning a transfer to an employee between compensatory and non-compensatory elements.
51
1.R.C. § 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses, including "a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for services actually rendered."
521d.

"3See Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17, infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
54

1.R.C. § 262 prohibits the deduction of "personal . . . expenses."
55Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 287. See supra text accompanying note 34. See also Shaviro, A Case Study
for Tax Reformers: The Taxation of Employee Awards and Other Business Gifts, 4 VA. TAX. REV. 241
(1985), in which the author suggests that it is unacceptable from a policy standpoint to allow the employer
to deduct the value of a gift while allowing the employee to exclude the value of the gift from gross income.
56
See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
7See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(1), authorizing a deduction for the expenses of business related travel
only if the trip is primarily for business as opposed to personal purposes.
58 See, e.g., Bank of Palm Beach v. United States, 476 F2d 1343 (Ct. Cl. 1973), infra notes 155-62 and
accompanying text.
59
Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 387. See also supra text accompanying note 37.
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A. Holiday Gifts

To the average person, a birthday or holiday present is the quintessential
gift. If social pressure is disregarded, most such presents are manifestations
of generosity and as such fall squarely within the income tax concept of gifts.06
In the employer-employee context, however, generosity and social pressure are
not necessarily the donor's only motivations. The employer might also use the
occasion of a holiday or an employee's birthday to provide additional compensation, and virtually every birthday or holiday gift to an employee is made,
at least in part, for the purpose of creating or enhancing good will. 6' Under
a strict application of the traditional test, many of these transfers would be taxable to the recipients. The Internal Revenue Service has, however, taken a more
liberal approach. In Revenue Ruling 59-58,62 the Service stated that the value
of a "turkey, ham, or other item of merchandise" given by an employer to each
of his employees as a holiday gift is excludable from the employees' gross income. The same Ruling held that the employer can deduct the cost of the items
as a business expense since such gifts are made "primarily for the business
purpose of promoting good relations with ... employees." 6 3 Cash gifts, and
presumably gifts of more than nominal value,64 would fall outside the scope
of the Ruling and would be includable in the employee's gross income.
B.

Employer Charity

According to the Dubersteinopinion, a transfer is an excludable gift if the
giver is motivated by "charity." 65 Thus, if an employer makes a gift to an employee out of primarily charitable instincts, the gift is excludable under the Duberstein criteria. Typically, however, the employer's motives are not purely charitable. In addition to the psychic satisfaction of helping someone in need, the
employer expects to derive enhanced good will from such transfers. Presumably,
under Duberstein the excludability of the transfer as a gift would depend upon
which motivation predominates - charitable generosity or public relations. 66
The Service addressed the tax treatment of employer charity in Revenue
Ruling 53-131, 6 7 which involved a corporation 68 that was one of the largest
6

°See supra text accompanying notes 27-31.
61See generally supra notes 41-46.
62
63

Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
/d.

64Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) specifically requires that cash bonuses must be included in the recipients' gross
income. Revenue Ruling 59-58 cites "the small amount involved" as justification for excluding the value
of the merchandise from the employees' gross income. 1959-1 C.B. at 18.
65Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285. See also supra text accompanying note 11.
66See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
671953-2 C.B. 112.

68The fact that the donor was a corporation is significant in view of the government's position in Duberstein that "a business corporation cannot properly make a gift of its assets." 363 U.S. at 287.
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employers in an area that was struck by a tornado. The corporation established
a relief fund to provide assistance to employees who had suffered injuries or
whose homes had been damaged or destroyed. The Ruling first addressed the
question of whether the employer may deduct its contributions to the fund as
a business expense. 69 The Ruling holds that the contributions are ordinary and
necessary expenses, and therefore are deductible, because they promote goodwill among the employees as well as in the community at large, which is "essential to the successful conduct of the business." 70 The Ruling then addresses
the tax treatment of the recipients and concludes that payments received from
the fund are not includable in gross income. While the Ruling points out that
the payments are "gratuitous and spontaneous," 71 the word "gift" does not appear in the Ruling and no reference is made to the statutory exclusion for gifts.
Apparently, the Service concluded that such items simply do not constitute gross
income.72 In view of the position taken by the Commission six years later in
Duberstein,73 this is the only plausible explanation for the non-taxability of
the payments to the employees. The payments would not be gifts under the standards proposed by the government in Duberstein - i.e. that payments by an

employer to an employee, especially if they are deductible by the employer,
are not gifts 7 4 Moreover, the government argued in Duberstein that a corporation, as a matter of state law, is incapable of making a gift.7 5 Even under the
Supreme Court's Duberstein criteria, payments made primarily for public rela76
tions purposes do not reflect "detached and disinterested generosity."
Unlike Revenue Ruling 53-131, Revenue Ruling 59-5877 specifically states
that the holiday turkey or ham is an "excludable gift." 78 For reasons similar
to those outlined above, this conclusion is totally at odds with the government's
position in Duberstein.79 The Ruling can be explained only on practical grounds.
Presumably, the Service decided that if only nominal amounts are involved, 0
the revenue to be generated by taxing the value of the holiday turkey is outweighed
by the negative sentiment that would be generated by requiring employers to
691953-2 C.B. at 113.
70

Id.

71Id.

Similar results have been reached in the context of government and institutional charity. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17, ruling that federal payments to needy victims of major disasters do not constitute gross income to the recipients.
72

73

Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 278.

74 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
75See supra note 68.
76

See supra text at note 29. See also Willis and Hawley, supra note 50, suggesting that under Bogardus,
the presence of any motive other than generosity should preclude gift treatment.
7TRev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
781d. at 18.

79See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
801959-1 C.B. at 18.
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treat such items as compensation and withhold the resulting tax liability from
the employees' pay.8
C. Payments to Spouses of Deceased Employees
Gratuitous8 2 payments to the surviving spouse or other dependent of a
deceased employee represent a type of employer charity, but they are by nature
different from charity of the type described in Revenue Ruling 53-131.83 Unlike
the disaster aid described in Revenue Ruling 53-131, payments made by reason
of an employee's death normally reflect gratitude, and arguably compensation,
for the deceased employee's services. By statute, recipients of such payments
may exclude up to $5,000 from gross income, regardless of whether the payment is the result of spontaneous generosity or a contract between the employer
and the employee8 4 If the employer gives the employee's survivor more than
$5,000, the excess is includable in the recipient's gross income unless it constitutes an excludable gift under the Duberstein criteria.85 As evidenced by the
cases and rulings discussed below, the question of when payments to the survivors of deceased employees are gifts has been, and continues to be, difficult.
The Service's earliest pronouncement on the question of gratuitous payments
by an employer to a deceased employee's survivors was issued in 1921.86 In declaring that a corporation's payment of the equivalent of two months' salary to the
widow of a deceased officer was an excludable gift, the Service appeared to
87
be applying the common law definition of "gift" later rejected in Duberstein.
Without elaboration, the Decision simply states that as a gratuitous transfer
not supported by consideration, the payment constitutes a gift. 88 The Service
applied similar reasoning in I.T. 332989 to conclude that monthly payments
made to an officer's widow for one year after the officer's death were gifts.
The Ruling states that "(w)hen an allowance is paid by an organization to which
the recipient has rendered no service, the amount is deemed to be a gift or
gratuity and is not subject to Federal income tax in the hands of the recipient." 90
Citing regulations then in effect, the Service also ruled that the employer could
81Cf Shaviro, supra note 55, at 245-46, suggesting that the value of such items to the recipient is more
psychic than economic.
12 If the employer is contractually obligated to make such payments, they are not gifts even under the traditional property law definition.
3
1 See supra text accompanying notes 67-76.
84

1.R.C. § 101(b). The exclusion is not available, however, if the employee had a "nonforfeitable right"
to receive the payment while alive. I.R.C. § 101(b)(2)(B).
8'See text at notes 26-31 supra.
86
0.D. 1017, 5 C.B. 101 (1921).
87See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
885 C.B. at 101.
891939-2 C.B. 153.
901d. at 154.
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deduct the payments as a business expense. 91 The Service changed its position
on the gift status of payments to survivors of deceased employees in I.T. 4027.92
Revoking O.D. 101793 and modifying I.T. 3329, the Service stated that payments
made by an employer to the widow of a deceased employee in consideration
of services rendered constitute gross income, even in the absence of a contractual obligation or established plan.?4 Citing a Fifth Circuit case 95 the Service
stated that I.T. 3329 was incorrect in focusing on the fact that the recipient
of the death benefit had not performed services.9 6 The correct inquiry, according to I.T. 4027, is whether services have been performed for the payor, either
by the recipient or the deceased employee. 7
Prior to Duberstein, and to a large extent since Duberstein, courts have
been reluctant to accept the Service's position that payments to the survivors
of deceased employees are not gifts. Generally, the courts have applied a checklist
of factors enunciated by the Tax Court in 1955, 91 often concluding that the
payments are excludable gifts.99
In Estate of Hellstrom v. Commissioner,'0 0 a pre-Dubersteincase, the Tax

Court addressed the question of gratuitous payments to the widow of a deceased
employee. The Court held that the payments were excludable gifts even though
they were made "in recognition of' 101 the deceased employee's services. 0 2 The
"controlling facts," according to the Court, were that the payments were made
to (the widow), and not to (the employee's) estate; that there was no obligation
on the part of the corporation to pay any additional compensation to (the
employee); (the corporation) derived no benefit from the payment; (the widow)
performed no services for the corporation; and ... (the services of the deceased
03
employee) had been fully compensated for.'

91The applicable regulation provided that when the amount of the salary of an officer or employee is paid
for a limited period after his death to his widow or heirs, in recognition of the services rendered by the
individual, such payments may be deducted. Id.
921950-2 C.B. 9.
930.D. 1017, 5 C.B. 101.
941950-2 C.B. at 10-11.
9'Varnedoe v. Allen, 158 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1946).
96See text at note 90, supra.
911950-2 C.B. at 10.
91 Estate of Hellstrom v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 916 (1955). The criteria are outlined infra text accompanying note 103.
99See infra text accompanying notes 122-34.
10OHellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955).
101The corporate minutes indicated that the payments were "in recognition of' the deceased employee's
services. Id. at 918.
'2The Court quoted language from Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937), stating that "a gift
is none the less a gift because inspired by gratitude for past faithful services." Hellstrom, 24 T.C. at 919.
IaHellstrom, 24 T.C. at 920.
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Based upon these factors, the Court concluded that the principal motive
of the corporation in making the payment was to do an act of kindness for the
employee's widow, and that the payment therefore was a gift.10 4 The Court found
no significance in the fact that the corporation had deducted the payment as
05
a business expense.'
While the Tax Court's ultimate conclusion in Hellstrom - that the corporation's primary motivation was to do an act of kindness - is stated in terms
that are consistent with the standards later articulated in Duberstein,'0 6 most
of the factors cited by the Court indicate that the case may well have been decided
on the basis of the common law definition of gift (i.e., a transfer of property
without consideration). This would explain the Tax Court's "abrupt swerve" 107
after the Supreme Court emphasized in Duberstein that the absence of consideration does not make a transfer an excludable gift. 0 8 The Tax Court made
0 9 its first post-Duits abrupt swerve in Estate of Pierpont v. Commissioner,'
1
berstein case addressing the death benefit question. 0 In Pierpont, the Court
concluded that payments essentially indistinguishable from those in Hellstrom
were not excludable as gifts but rather represented additional compensation
for the deceased employee's services.' The Court based its conclusion on a
finding that payments "in recognition of services rendered" by the deceased
employee reflect not "detached and disinterested generosity" but a dominant
motivation to pay additional compensation. 1 2 The Court also cited the lack
of any evidence that the payments were motivated by the needs of the employee's
survivors.'"'
In two memorandum decisions issued shortly after Pierpont, the Tax Court
cited Pierpontand applied similar reasoning in concluding that awards to widows
of deceased employees were not excludable gifts. In Estate of Kuntz, 1 4 the directors of the deceased employee's corporate employer authorized payments to his
widow "as additional compensation and in consideration of services heretofore
104Id.
05

at 919.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
' 07 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 61 (1971), accused the Tax
Court of making an "abrupt swerve" from its earlier position on the issue of payments to survivors of
deceased employees.
' 0 8Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
10935 T.C. 65 (1960).
0
" The decision of Pierpont had been delayed pending the issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Duberstein. Pierpont, 35 T.C. at 67.
"'The taxpayer's late husband was president and majority shareholder of a wholesale drug company. The
corporation paid the taxpayer approximately $10,000 following the death of her husband. The payments
were designated "salary continuation," and were roughly equivalent to six months' salary. Id. at 66. Perhaps
coincidentally, in view of Duberstein, the corporation also gave the taxpayer a Cadillac. Id.
"21d. at 68.
1 Id.
06

13

I

Id.

1,29 T.C.M. (P-H) 60-1531 (1960).
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rendered to this corporation by the (deceased employee)." 115 The Court had
little trouble concluding, as a factual matter, that the directors did not intend
the payment as a gift." 16 Likewise, in Estate of Olsen ,117 a corporate resolution
citing "the valuable services which (the deceased employee) has rendered to
(the corporate employer) during the last several years" resulted in a finding
of taxable compensation rather than non-taxable gift." 8
In Pierpont, Kuntz, and Olsen, the Tax Court clearly implied that it was
abandoning the criteria articulated in Hellstrom"19 in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Duberstein. In Pierpont, the Court stated that, in view of Duberstein's "clarification" of the subject, "we have not found it profitable to discuss
the numerous earlier decisions in the lower courts dealing with payments by
an employer to the widow of a deceased employee." 120 Kuntz and Olsen contain similar statements discounting the value of pre-Dubersteinprecedent.' 2'
The appellate courts have not been willing to view pre-Dubersteinprecedent as obsolete. Pierpont, Kuntz, and Olsen were all reversed on appeal, and
the appellate court opinions in all three cases rely to some extent on preDuberstein precedent. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Tax
Court's Pierpont decision in a appeal styled Poyner v. Commissioner.'22 Stating
that Duberstein "did not destroy the authority of the earlier Tax Court cases and the
guides enunciated in them," 1 23 the Court recited the Hellstrom124 criteria and
observed that "(t)he stipulated facts directly respond to every one of the five
factors, and in each instance the response is favorable to the widow."' 25 The Court
conceded, however, that in light of Duberstein, the fact finder could consider
"whatever other factors (it) might think helpful,"' 126 and remanded the case for
"proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 27

11529 T.C.M. (P-H) 61-882 (1961).
1161d"
I730 T.C.M. (P-H) 61-882 (1961).

11830 T.C.M. at 61-883.

119See supra text at note 103, supra.
12035 T.C. at 69.

121In Olsen, the Court said

[Wle think it unnecessary, in view of the clarification of this general subject by the opinion in the
Duberstein case, to discuss the numerous decisions heretofore entered (either prior to said opinion
or without consideration of the principles therein set forth) which have dealt with payments by
employers to widows of deceased employees. 30 T.C.M at 61-885.
In Kuntz, the Court distinguished a Sixth Circuit case cited by the taxpayer, but "note(d) for completeness"
the fact that the case was decided before Duberstein. 29 T.C.M. at 60-1532.
122301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). Poyner was the co-executor of Mr. Pierpont's estate.
123301 F.2d at 292.
124See text at note 103, supra.
125301 F2d at 291.
126301 F.2d at 292.
2
1 7Id. Apparently, the decision on remand was not reported.

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

In reversing the Tax Court in Kuntz, 128 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on Reed v. United States, 2 9 a per curiam opinion it had issued prior
to the Supreme Court's decision of Duberstein, and a Tenth Circuit case decided after Duberstein.30 Distinguishing Duberstein on the facts, 3 1 the Court held
that the "only reasonable inference" from the facts was that the payment was
a gift, and reversed the Tax Court.'3 2 In Olsen' 33 the Eighth Circuit cited Poyner
and Kuntz and reversed the Tax Court's decision, stating that "[i]f the payment
made to Mrs. Kuntz upon the death of her husband was a gift, so was the payment to Mrs. Olsen." '34
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's finding of
"no gift" in Smith v. Commissioner,35 declining to follow Olsen, Poyner, and
Kuntz because "the question ...remains basically one of fact, for determination on a case-by-case basis." 136 Applying the Duberstein rationale, the Court
concluded that the Tax Court's factual determination was not "clearly erroneous"
37
and therefore should not be disturbed.
Possibly smarting from the Poyner, Kuntz, and Olsen reversals, the Tax
Court resurrected the Hellstrom criteria 38 in Estate of Carter,13 9 a 1970 memorandum decision. The opinion begins with a citation to Duberstein for the proposition that the question of whether a transfer is a gift is one of fact and that
the primary consideration is the intention of the transferor. 40 Then the Court
outlined various factors that militate for or against a conclusion that a payment
is a gift, citing the Hellstrom criteria as well as numerous other factors. 41 The
Court proceeded to apply those factors to the facts at hand: a payment of approximately one year's salary and commissions to the widow of a deceased
brokerage firm employee. 42 In concluding that the payment was not a gift, the
128 Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962).
129277 F2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960), aff'g 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D.Ky. 1959).
130 Kasynski v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
131300 F2d at 852.
132 1d. The "only reasonable inference" language was taken from the Kasynski opinion, where the Court
of Appeals held that the District Court's finding of "gift" was "a reasonable inference." 284 F.2d at 146.
133Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1962).
134302 F.2d at 673. The Court also cited several pre-Duberstein cases. 302 F.2d at 674.
135305 F.2d 778 (1962), aff'g 30 T.C.M. (P-H) 61-848 (1961).
136305 F.2d at 782, quoting Duberstein.
137305 F.2d at 780. The taxpayer's late husbandwas an employee and shareholder of a family owned business.

After her husband's death, the corporation paid the taxpayer approximately $72,000 over a two year period.
The Tax Court found that the motive behind the payments was to provide additional compensation for
the decedent's services. 305 F.2d at 779.
'38See text at note 103, supra.
13939 T.C.M (P-H) 70-1538 (1970).
14039 T.C.M. at 70-1541.
41

1
42

Id.

' The decedent worked for the brokerage firm for 38 years, but had no ownership interest in the firm.
39 T.C.M at 70-1538.
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Court relied primarily on two factors. First, the Court pointed out that the
employer had deducted the payment as a business expense. 43 The Court said
that deduction by the payor, "while not conclusive negates donative intent." 144
The Court also emphasized the lack of any evidence that the payments were
45
based on the surviving spouse's financial need.
Accusing the Tax Court of making an "abrupt swerve" from its preDuberstein position, 46 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
Court's decision in Carter.147 The Court concluded that the facts in Carterwere
indistinguishable from those in Olsen and more favorable to the taxpayer than
those in Kuntz,' 48 and implied that the Tax Court should return to the preDuberstein approach taken in Hellstrom 49 The Court buttressed its reasoning
with the observation that the Tax Court's tendency to find "no gift" in postDuberstein cases, compared with the district courts' almost uniform finding
of "gift," imposed an unfair burden on taxpayers who could not afford to pay
the disputed liability and sue for a refund.' 50 In a dissenting opinion, one judge
pointed out that the majority's de novo examination of the facts went far beyond
the appropriate standard of review.' 5' The dissenting opinion stresses Duber52
stein's message that the question is one of: fact to be decided by the trial court.
In response to the majority's comments on the divergence between the Tax Court
and the District Courts, the dissenting opinion states that "Duberstein contemplated lack of 'symmetry' between 'the variety of forums in which federal
income tax cases can be tried.' "1'5
As indicated above, the employer deducted its payment to Mr. Carter's
widow.5 4 The Commissioner challenged that deduction, and the issue was
litigated in Bank of Palm Beach v. United States." In holding for the taxpayer,
the Court of Claims cited the same factors the government had cited in Carter
to argue that the payment was not intended as a gift - i.e., that the payment
represented additional compensation for Mr. Carter's services and that the
14339 T.C.M. at 70-1542. The employer's deduction was later upheld by the Court of Claims in Bank of
Palm Beach v. United States, infra note 155.
14439 T.C.M. at 70-1542.
145Id.
146

Estate of Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 61, 65.

147Id.

14453 F.2d at 70. Presumably, the Court found the Carter facts more appealing because the deceased
employee had been in poor health for some time and owned no interest in the employer corporation.
149 d. at 64-69.
150453 F.2d at 67-69.
151453 F.2d at 70 (Davis, J., dissenting).
52

1 Id"

153453 F.2d at 72, citing 363 U.S. at 290.
15 4 See supra text accompanying note 143.
155476 F.2d 1343 (1973).
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amount of the payment was determined by reference to his salary rather than

the needs of his widow.156 The Court went on to point out that the payment
was also prompted by "the desire by (the employer) to secure a legitimate
business benefit, an increase in employee morale." 157 Implicitly, the Court concluded that the payment was not intended as a gift, notwithstanding the Second Circuit's holding in Carter.58 The Court distinguished several earlier cases

which had denied deductions for payments to survivors of deceased employeeshareholders, since Mr. Carter had not owned an interest in his employer's
business. 59 Thus, the payment to Mr. Carter's widow could not be called a

disguised dividend. 60 The Court concluded that the facts were more closely
analogous to those in Fifth Avenue Coach Lines v. Commissioner,'6' a case in
which the Tax Court had held deductible an employer's payments to the widow
of a deceased non-owner employee.

62

D. Retirement Payments

Section 61(a)(11) provides that pensions are includable in gross income.
Section 102 would, of course, exclude from gross income any payment to a
retiring employee resulting from "detached and disinterested generosity" 163
rather than a desire to compensate the employee for past services. The Tax
64
Court addressed the question of gratuitous pensions in Walker v. Commissioner.
Walker, a pre-Dubersteincase, involved a corporate employer's gratuitous pay-

t65
ment of six months' salary to an employee forced to retire for health reasons.
In holding that the payment represented taxable compensation and not an ex-

cludable gift, the Tax Court stated that if the recipient of a payment has performed services for the payor, "the presumption is that the amount received
is for the service and is not a gift." 166 In concluding that the taxpayer had failed
to rebut this presumption, the Court cited the payor's deduction of the pay-

ment,

67 a

statement in the minutes of the committee meeting authorizing the

56

1 d. at 1348.
157d. at 1349.
" 'The opinion states that a payment to the surviving spouse of a deceased employee represents deductible
compensation "(i)f the amount paid to the widow is not, in reality, a disguised gift ...
" Id. at 1347.
The opinion is self-contradictory in that it also states that "a payment might be excludable by the recipient
and nevertheless deductible by the employer." Id. at 1345.
159476 F.2d at 1347-48, n.7.
160 Id.
16131 T.C. 1080 (1959), rev'd on other issues 281 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1960).
162 The Tax Court concluded that the payments were additional compensation for the deceased employee's
services. Fifth Avenue Coach, 31 T.C. at 1086. While the employee's widow had not included the payments
in gross income in the years in questions, 1944 through 1948, she had reported as gross income payments
received in years subsequent to the issuance of I.T. 4027. Id. See supra notes C-55 through C-60 and
accompanying text.
' 63 Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
16425
65

1 Id.
66
1 1d.

T.C. 832 (1956).

at 834. The employee had suffered a nervous breakdown.
at 836. The Court cited Noel v. Parrot, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
167Walker, 25 T.C. at 835.
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payment that the taxpayer "merited some gift from the Company in recognition of his loyalty," 168 and the fact that the shareholders of the corporation had
not approved the transfer. 169 Implicit in the Court's reliance on the lack of shareholder authorization is acceptance of the principle that a corporation normally
cannot make a gift, a position later asserted by the government in Duberstein.70
In a series of pre-Dubersteincases involving payments by church congregations to retiring ministers, the Courts of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's findings of "no gift" with striking similarity to the post-Dubersteincases involving payments to spouses of deceased employees.' 71 The first case, Schall v. Commissioner,172 involved a congregation's payment of $2,000 per year to its minister,
who had retired because of poor health. The resolution authorizing the payment characterized it as "salary or honorarium" and named the taxpayer "Pastor
Emeritus," a position "with no pastoral authority or duty." 17 The Court concluded that the payments, although gratuitous, represented compensation for
past services and thus were not excludable as a gift. 74 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the Tax Court "clearly erred in holding that the payments
. . . were taxable income." 175 The Court stated that "all the facts and circumstances

. . .

clearly prove an intent to make a gift," 176 and that "a gift is

none the less a gift because inspired by gratitude for past faithful service of
the recipient." 177

Abernethy v. Commissioner 78 involved facts similar to those in Schall, and
the taxpayer cited the Fifth Circuit's decision as authority for his argument that
his pension payments should be excluded from gross income as gifts. 179 The

Tax Court stated that there was "a distinguishing difference between the facts
of (Schall)and those in the instant case" 180 but failed to explain what that difference was.' 8' Perhaps more to the point, the Tax Court said "we are not convinced that our holding in the Schall case was wrong notwithstanding the reversal
168

1d. at 838.

69

at 837 (citing Noel 15 F.2d 669).
1 Duberstein, 363 U.S. 287.
1 1d.
70
71

' See supra text at notes 122-134.

17211

T.C. 111(1948).

171Id. at 113.
174Id. at 114-15. The Court pointed out that the taxpayer had not received a raise in 18 years and suggested
that the congregation suddenly realized that he had been undercompensated when he was forced to retire
early because of his health. Id.
1 5
7 Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893, 894 (5th Cir. 1949).
76

1

1d

1771d. (citing Bogardus 302 U.S. 34).
17820 T.C. 593 (1953).
at 594.
l°/d. at 596.
181Presumably, the Court was referring to the fact that the taxpayer in Schall retired unexpectedly after
suffering a heart attack.
179Id.
8
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thereof by the Circuit Court." 182 The Tax Court reached a similar conclusion
in Mutch v. Commissioner,'83 a memorandum decision issued eight days after
Abernethy and involving virtually identical facts.
Citing the Fifth Circuit's holding in Schall, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision in Mutch.184 The Third Circuit's opinion relies heavily on the fact that the taxpayer was not required to render any
additional services in order to receive his retirement payments.1 85 Three months
after the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Mutch, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, in a per curiam decision, reversed the Tax
186
Court's decision in Abernethy.
In the wake of the reversals in Schall, Mutch, and Abernethy, the Service
decided to give up the fight, announcing in Revenue Ruling 55-422187 that it
would not continue to litigate cases involving payments by church congregations to retired preachers if certain criteria are present. Those criteria include
a close personal relationship between the preacher and the congregation, the
lack of any established plan or practice of making such payments, the absence
of any duty on the part of the recipient to render further services, and evidence
that the amount paid was determined in light of the recipient's needs and the
congregation's ability to pay. 8 ' The lack of post-Dubersteincases involving such
payments tends to indicate that the Service continues to follow Rev. Rul.
55-422.189
The Service did litigate a case involving a preacher's retirement payments
in 1960, and the Tax Court agreed that the payments involved in that case fell
outside the scope of Rev. Rul. 55-422 and the Schall, Mutch, and Abernethy
90 involved payments
decisions. The case, Perkins v. Commissioner,'
to a retired
Methodist minister. The payments were funded in part by contributions made
by the minister's congregation to a central pension fund for Methodist ministers,
but the amount of taxpayer's pension was determined under a formula established
by the regional Conference and the disbursements were actually made by the
Conference's Board of Pensions. 191 In holding that the payments were not gifts,
the Tax Court cited the existence of an established plan for making such
payments, the lack of a personal relationship between the payor (the Board of
182 Schall, 20 T.C. at 596.
18312
84

T.C.M. (CCH) 705 (1953).

1 Mutch v. Commissioner, 209 F2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1954).
185209 F.2d at 392.
86

1

Abernethy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

1871955-1

C.B. 14.

1881ld.

189Cf.Brimm v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (P-H) 68-1261 (1968), and Estate of Sweeney v. Commissioner,
48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-1503 (1979).
19034 T.C. 117 (1960).
19 11d. at 118.
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Pensions) and the recipient, and the fact that the amount of the payments was
192
not determined with reference to the taxpayer's needs.
In one of the few post-Dubersteincases dealing with payments to retiring
employees, the Tax Court, in a memorandum opinion, held for the taxpayer.
The case, Brimm v. Commissioner,'93 involved an individual who had taught
at a church-supported graduate school for 11 years. The taxpayer was one of
several employees who received a payment equal to one year's salary when
the school closed as a result of increasing costs and declining enrollment. 194
Recognizing that the payment was an expression of gratitude for services
rendered, the Court nevertheless held that the payment was a gift under the
Duberstein criteria. 195 The employer admittedly was not obligated to make the
payment, and the Court pointed out that no further benefit such as good will
could be derived, since the employer was closing its doors. 9 6 The Court cited
the Court of Appeals opinions in Schall, Mutch, and Abernethy as authority
for the proposition that "long and faithful service may create the atmosphere
of goodwill and kindliness toward the recipient which tends to support a finding that a gift rather than additional compensation was intended." 197
The taxpayer in Estate of Sweeney v. Commissioner,'98 a 1979 Tax Court
memorandum decision, did not fare as well. The taxpayer, a medical doctor,
was the founder of a charitable foundation, which operated a summer camp
for diabetic children. The taxpayer was employed by the foundation from 1950
until 1975 and worked without pay until he began receiving a $500 per month
"honorarium" in 1964.199 The foundation continued to pay the taxpayer $500
per month after his retirement in 1975, and the payments continued until his
death in 1976.00 The taxpayer had not reported any of the payments as gross
income, contending that they were excludable gifts. 20 1 Citing Duberstein, the
Court held that the payments represented compensation for services and thus
were not gifts, notwithstanding the lack of a contractual obligation or the fact
that the directors of the foundation called the payments "gifts." 202

192 1d. at 120.
19337 T.C.M. (P.H) 68-1261.
1941d"

95 Ironically, the Court quoted the same passage from Bogardus that the Fifth Circuit had quoted in reversing the Tax Court's decision in Schall. 37 T.C.M at 68-1264. See supra text accompanying note 177.
196 T.C. Memo (P-H) at 68-1264.
197Id.
19848 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-1503.
99

1 Id.
200

at 79-1505.

Id.

201Id.
202

Id. at 79-1506.
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E. Bonuses
It would seem that a bonus paid to an employee as a reward for services
performed is inherently compensatory and therefore not a gift, even if the
employer is under no contractual obligation to make the payment.20 3 Nevertheless, courts have grappled with the tax character of such payments for over
sixty years20 4 and have continued to do so even after the Dubersteindecision?05
The Board of Tax Appeals first addressed the question in John H. Parrott.20 6 In Parrott, a corporation's board of directors voted to set aside a
"gratuitous appropriation" 20 7 of roughly $150,0002o8 for distribution to certain
officers and employees in such proportions as the members of the corporation's executive committee "deem wise and proper."2 0 9 The taxpayer, an
employee and director of the corporation, received a $35,000 share of the appropriation, which was paid to him in cash.210 After the payments were authorized, but before they were made, most of the corporation's stock was sold.21'
The purchaser approved the payments, and the recipients of the payments resigned their positions upon receipt of the payments0' 2 The corporation deducted
z 3
the payments as salaries '
The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the taxpayer's contention that the payment was a gift, noting that the evidence supported a conclusion that the payment "was intended for the purpose of rewarding officers and employees for
long and faithful service and of encouraging them and their successors to fidelity
and zeal in the future." 214 The Board added that it would be "irregular" for
5
a corporation's directors to make a "gift" of corporate assets.'
The taxpayer paid the deficiency under protest and sued for a refund in
2 7
United States District Court,21 6 which awarded a judgment to the taxpayer. '
20 3Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285.
20
4See infra text and accompanying notes 206-299.
205
See Abdella v. Commissioner, T.C.M (P.H.) 83-2498 (1983).
2061 B.T.A. 1 (1924).
2071 B.T.A. at 1.
208
09

The amount was based on $3 per share of the corporation's outstanding stock. Id.

2 1d.
2 10

1d. at 2.

211Id.
212Id.

213/d.
214

1d. at 4.

2 15

21

Id.

6Parrott v. Noel, 8 F.2d 368 (1925). Prior to 1926, decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals were appealable
de novo in federal district court. C. HAMEL, PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE U.S. BOARD
OF TAX APPEALS 168 (1938).
217Parrott, 8 F.2d at 370.
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Applying the traditional property law definition of "gift" - a transfer of property without consideration - the Court found that the payment was indeed a
gift.218 The Court conceded that a gift of corporate assets by the corporation's
directors would be unlawful without consent by the shareholders, but concluded that the shareholders had implicitly approved of the distribution since they
were aware of it and did not object. 2 19
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision, 220 stating that
to call the distribution a gift "would do violence to the well understood mean-

ing of that word.

...."

221

The Court concluded that the payment was not without

consideration. Rather, the payment was made as compensation for the past services performed by the taxpayer and his agreement to resign his position. 222
The Court found significance in the fact that the corporation had deducted the
payment as well as the fact that a gift of corporate assets by the directors would
2 23
be illegal.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited Parrottin Fisher v. Commissioner,224 affirming the Board's determination that a bonus paid to a resigning
employee was not an excludable gift, even though the employer was under no
225
contractual obligation to make the payment.
The Board of Tax Appeals distinguished Parrott and held for the taxpayer
in David R. Daly.226 Daly involved payments by a corporation to its president.
The president's annual salary was $20,000, and over a thirteen month period
corporation's directors authorized three "gifts" to the president, totalling
$72,000.227 The president had become seriously ill shortly before the first payment was authorized and died approximately six months after the third payment was authorized. 22 8 He also continued to receive his salary until one month
before his death.2 29 The Board concluded that the payments were not supported
by consideration and thus were excludable gifts.2 30 The Board distinguished
Parrotton the ground that the employer in Daly, unlike the employer in Par21

ld. at 370.

2 19

1d. at 371.
220Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669.
221
/d.at 672.
2 22

1d. at 671.

2 23

1d. The Court dismissed the District Court's ratification theory, stating that "we are dealing with the
interpretation of resolutions, not the validity of the action taken under them." Id.
22459 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932).
2 25

d. at 193. The Court accorded significance to the fact that the employer had deducted the payment
as a business expense. Id.
2263 B.T.A. 1042 (1926).
227
/d.at 1043.
228

229

1d.

1d.

230 Id.at 1044.
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rott, had not deducted the payment as compensation for services. 231
2 z
The Board of Tax Appeals again distinguished Parottin John H. Rosseter
In Rosseter, the taxpayer was president of a corporation, and the shareholders
of the corporation approved a resolution to make a $50,000 "gift" to the taxpayer "as evidence of the appreciation of the stockholders for the very efficient
and valuable services rendered to the company." 2 3 3 The Board found that the
intention to make a gift was "clear and conclusive," presumably because of
the language in the shareholders' resolution. 234 The Board stressed the fact that
the corporation had not deducted the payment and distinguished Parrott,
presumably on that basis.2 35 One judge dissented in a two sentence opinion,
concluding that "(t)he so-called "gift" received by Rosseter was, in the final
analysis, compensation received for services." 236 The Court of Appeals affirmed
237
the Board's decision in favor of the taxpayer.

In C.D. Jones,235 a case decided four months before Rosseter, the Board
of Tax Appeals upheld the Service's determination that payments to corporate
employees upon a sale of the corporation's stock were not excludable gifts. The
Jones case involved payments made by a trustee for the selling shareholders
out of the proceeds from a sale of all of the corporation's stock. 239 The gift
was divided among the corporation's employees in proportions set out in a letter from the corporation's president to the trustee. 240 The Board was "unable
to distinguish this proceeding in principle from the case of Noel v. Parrott.'"241
The Board was not persuaded by the opinion of a dissenting judge, who argued
that the facts were distinguishable from those in Parrottbecause the "gifts"
were paid out of the proceeds to be received by the shareholders rather than
out of corporate assets. 242 The Court of Appeals, however, found this distinc2 43
tion significant and reversed the Board's decision.

231

1d. at 1045.

232 12 B.T.A. 254 (1928).
2331d.
234

1d. at 256.
1d. Parrot might also be distinguished on the ground that it involved an action by the corporation's
directors rather than its shareholders, but the Board's opinion does not point out this distinction.
235

23612
237

B.T.A. at 256.

Blair v. Rosseter, 33 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929).
238 10 B.T.A. 202 (1928).
2 39

1d. at 206. The contract between the purchaser and the selling shareholders had originally called for
the company to make the payments, but at the purchaser's request the provision obligating the company
to make the gifts was removed and the purchase price was increased by the amount of the proposed gifts.

Id. at 205.
24 0
1d. at 206.
24 1

1d. at 208.

24 2

1d. at 210 (Green, dissenting).

24 3

Jones v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1929).
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The Board of Tax Appeals appeared to change course in William C.
Barnes,244 holding that a payment similar to the one in Jones245 was an excludable gift.246 The Board cited the Third Circuit's Jones opinion as authority
and made no attempt to distinguish its own Jones opinion.2 47 Ironically, both
the Court of Claims 248 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 249 held
for the Commissioner in cases arising out of the same transaction as Barnes.
In Lunsford v. Commissioner,250 the directors of an acquired corporation
voted to make a "gift" from corporate assets to an employee of the acquiring
corporation. The employee had represented the acquiring corporation in the
purchase transaction, and the directors of the acquired company stated that they

wished to "remember (the employee) with a momento .... 251 The gift was
"

contingent on approval of the owner of the acquiring corporation, which, of
2 52
course, indirectly owned the acquired corporation following the purchase.
The Board of Tax Appeals found that the payment was not a gift but instead
represented compensation for the employee's services in connection with the
acquisition. 253 The Court of Appeals reversed, relying primarily on the lack
254
of an employment relationship between the payor and the payee.
The taxpayer in Cunningham v. Commissioner255 received a bonus equal
to one year's salary when he resigned his position as president of an acquired
corporation to allow the new directors to name a new president. The Board of Tax
Appeals, without an opinion, affirmed the Service's determination that the payment was not a gift. 256 In a one page opinion that cites no authority, the Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the payment was "voluntary" and therefore a gift. 257

24417 B.T.A. 1002 (1929).

10 B.T.A. 202 (1928).

245

246The taxpayers were employees of El Paso & Southwestern Railroad Co., a wholly owned subsidiary
of a corporation called El Paso & Southwestern Co. (the "holding company"). The holding company sold
the subsidiary to another corporation and the shareholders of the holding company approved payment of
bonuses aggregating approximately $1,000,000 to the employees of the subsidiary. The bonuses were allocated
among the employees by three of the subsidiary's officers. 17 B.T.A. at 1002-7.
247
1d. at 1010-11.
248Schumacher v. United States, 55 F2d 1007 (1932).
249
Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1933).
25022 B.T.A. 881 (1931).
251
1d. at 882.
2521d.

253

1d. at 887.

2 54

Lunsford v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1933).

25567 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1933).

216 Wilfred H. Cunningham, 26 B.T.A. 1491 (1932) (memorandum decision).
257 Supra note 255. As evidence that the payment was without consideration, the Court pointed out that
the directors sought shareholder ratification. Id.
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A transaction that was factually similar to Parrott,258 Jones2 59 and Barnes,260
gave rise to three Court of Appeals decisions and, ultimately, a Supreme Court
case. The transaction involved employees of the Universal Oil Products Company. 6' The shareholders of Universal sold their stock for a total consideration
of $25,000,000 after taking $4,100,000 from the assets of Universal and forming a new corporation called Unopco.2 62 The stock of Unopco was held by the
original Universal shareholders in proportion to the Universal stock they
owned.2 63 At the suggestion of the Unopco board of directors, the shareholders
voted to distribute $607,500 of the $4,100,000 "as a bonus to sixty-four (64)
former and present employees, attorneys and experts of Universal Oil Products
Company ... in recognition of the valuable and loyal services of said employees,
attorneys and experts .. ," 264 The shareholders authorized the board of direc2 65
tors to determine how the bonus would be apportioned.
Several of the recipients maintained that their bonuses were excludable from
gross income as gifts. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the Commissioner's
determination that the bonuses were taxable compensation. 266 In separate proceedings, three of the recipients took their cases to the Court of Appeals. The
first of the three cases was decided by the First Circuit in February of 1937.
In that case, styled Walker v. Commissioner,2 67 the Court affirmed the Board's
decision. Stating that whether a payment constitutes a gift depends upon the
intention of the payor, as determined from the facts and circumstances surround69
ing the payment, 268 the Court declined to question the Board's finding of fact
The Court cited, but did not rely upon, an earlier statement by the Supreme
Court that "payment for services, even though entirely voluntary, [is] nevertheless compensation within the statute." 270 A dissenting judge argued that since
the recipient had not been an employee of Unopco, there was not "the slightest
27
evidence of compensation." 1

258

Parrott, I B.T.A. 1.

259Jones, 10 B.T.A. 202.

260Barnes, 17 B.T.A. 1002.
261Walker v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 1937).
26 2

26 3

1d.

1d.

26

41d.
265 Id.

266

All of the decisions were unreported memorandum decisions. E.g. Arthur G. Bogardus, 34 B.T.A. 1310

(1936).
26788 F.2d 61 (st Cir. 1937).
26 8
Id. at 62.
269

Id. at 63. The Court stated that while the evidence was "conflicting," the Board's determination was

final. Id.
270 Id. at 62, citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
27188 F.2d at 63 (Morton, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
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The Second Circuit decided the second case, Bogardus v. Helvering,272
in March of 1937. Writing for the Court, Judge Hand stated that when the donor
is under no legal obligation to make a payment, the status of the payment as
a gift depends upon the donor's motivation.2 73 If that motivation is a desire
2 74
to compensate the recipient for services, the payment is not an excludable gift.
While recognizing that an employer might make a gift to an employee, Judge
Hand observed that "such cases will be uncommon, especially if (the employer)
declares that the payment is 'in recognition of' past services." 275 Judge Hand
concluded that the same analysis should apply to the transfer authorized by
the Unopco shareholders, who had benefited from the employees' services, even
though they had not been their employers in the strict legal sense. 276 Ultimately, however, the Court based its conclusion on deference to the Board's initial
finding of fact. 2 77 One judge dissented, stating that "the facts indicate that the
shareholders of Unopco, by reason of selling their Universal shares, for such
fabulous sums, were moved to an act of 'spontaneous generosity,' rather than
, 278
actuated by a sense of moral obligation to pay for services .
The Fourth Circuit viewed the size of the shareholders' windfall as evidence
of a lack of donative intent in Hall v. Commissioner,279 the third Court of Appeals case dealing with the Unopco payments. In an opinion issued in April
of 1937, the Court observed that "the stockholders were cutting a larger melon
than they had anticipated and felt that certain faithful employees who had contributed greatly to its growth should be given a larger share than had theretofore
been allotted them." 280 Noting that the case fell "squarely within the principle
laid down by us in Noel v. Parrott,' the Court affirmed the Board's finding that
the payment was not a gift.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Bogardus case and reversed
the Second Circuit in a five-to-four decision. 282 Writing for the majority, Justice
Sutherland found that the payments were motivated by "spontaneous generosity" and therefore were excludable gifts.2 83 The opinion states that the Court
27288 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1937).
27 3
/d. at 648.
274

1d.

2751d.
276

1d"

2771d. at 649. Judge Hand stated that "the decision is not primarily for us at all; the Commissioner had

first to make his, and then the Board its own; more exactly, the taxpayer had to show the Board that the
Commissioner had been wrong, and he must show us not only that the Board was wrong, but that its
conclusion was beyond any reasonable inference from the evidence." Id.
27888 F.2d at 649 (Swan, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
27989 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1937). The decision was reversed on rehearing subsequent to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bogardus. 93 F2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1938).
28089 F.2d at 443.
28 1
282

283

1d.
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34.

1d. at 42.
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is free to review the lower court's determination because the question of whether
a transfer is a gift is "a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed
question of law and fact." 284 The Court also observed that since the concepts
of "gift" and "compensation" are mutually exclusive, "a bestowal of money
cannot, under the statute, be both a gift and a payment of compensation." 28 5
In finding that the payments in question were gifts, the Court relied heavily
on the lack of an employment relationship between the shareholders and the
employees. 2 8 6 The Court discounted the fact that the shareholders had derived
a benefit from the employees' services, stating that "(a) gift is none the less
a gift because inspired by gratitude for the past faithful service of the recipient." 287
Writing for himself as well as Justices Stone, Cardozo, and Black, Justice
Brandeis observed in dissent that "(t)o hold, as the prevailing opinion seems
to do, that every payment which in any aspect is a gift is perforce not compensation and hence relieved of any tax, is to work havoc with the law." 288 The
dissenting opinion is short and remarkably similar in principle to Duberstein
(a case that would not be decided until twenty-three years later). Justice Brandeis
stated that the critical question of whether the payment had been motivated
by pure generosity, as opposed to a desire to compensate the recipient, was
a question of fact.2 8 9 Concluding that the facts at hand would support either
interpretation, the dissenters would have let the Board's determination stand.2 90
The Duberstein opinion cites Bogardus at several points but neither endorses nor overrules it0 9 1 In a footnote, the Duberstein opinion intimates that
Bogardus was incorrect to the extent it treated the "gift" question as a question
of law. 92 A rejection of that aspect of Bogardus is implicit in the Duberstein
court's ultimate holding that the "gift" question is one of fact.2 93
Twenty-three years after the Dubersteindecision, the Tax Court addressed
a situation similar to that in Bogardus. In Jamie L. Abdella,294 a memorandum
decision, Judge Parker found that a payment to a corporate employee by
shareholders who had sold their stock "at an enormous profit" and "chose to
share some of those profits with certain employees and former employees of
284

Id. at 38-9. This appears to be contrary to the position later taken by the Court in Duberstein, 363 U.S. 290.
U.S. at 39.
1d. at 41-2.
287
Id. at 44.
28
11d. at 44.
285302
286

29
1 1d.
290

at 45.
at 45-6.
29'Duberstein, 363 U.S. 285, quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
292363 U.S. at 289 (footnote 11). In a rather indirect fashion, the footnote describes as "sound" an earlier
opinion's criticism of the Bogardus court's characterization of the question as one of law. Id.
293
See supra note 12.
294
T.C.M. (P-H) 83-2498 (1983).
1d.
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the corporation" was a

gift. 295

Stating that "the fact that the recipient . ..

previously performed services for a corporation . . . owned and controlled by
the payors ... does not necessarily make the payments compensation for past

services," the opinion cites Bogardus and points out in a footnote that "(t)he
world of nontaxable gifts did not, as (the Commissioner) suggests, begin anew
with (Duberstein)."296 The opinion quotes extensively from Duberstein, however,
and concedes that the Supreme Court "stated the governing principles" regarding excludable gifts in Duberstein.2 97 Curiously, Judge Parker concluded that
the payment was a gift even though the payors testified that the recipient had
been underpaid 298 and that they felt a moral obligation to share their profits
299

with him.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES OCCURRING AFTER DUBERSTEIN AND BEFORE THE TAX

REFORM ACT OF 1986
Two years after the Supreme Court decided Duberstein,3 00 Congress enacted
section 274(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.30 1 Section 274(b) represents Congress's first attempt to deal with the question of whether a payment can be both
an excludable gift and a deductible business expense - a possibility the Supreme
Court had refused to foreclose in Duberstein,302 and one that ultimately became
an officially reported reality with Carter30 3 and Bank of Palm Beach,30 4 cases
30 5
dealing with different sides of the same transaction.
295

1d. at 83-2502.

6

29 1d.
7

291d. at 83-2500.
29
1d. at 83-2502.
299d. at 83-2501.
30 0
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278.
3
1' As originally enacted, section 274(b) provided as follows:
(b) Gifts.(1) Limitation. - No deduction shall be allowed under section 162 or section 212 for any expense
for gifts made directly or indirectly to any individual to the extent that such expense, when
added to prior expenses of the taxpayer for gifts made to such individual during the same
taxable year, exceeds $25. For purposes of this section, the term "gift" means any item excludable from gross income of the recipient under section 102 which is not excludable from
his gross income under any other provision of this chapter, but such term does not include (A) an item having a cost to the taxpayer not in excess fo $4.00 on which the name of the taxpayer is clearly and permanently imprinted and which is one of a number of identical
items distributed generally by the taxpayer.
(B) a sign, display rack, or other promotional material to be used on the business premises
of the recipient, or
(C) an item of tangible personal property having a cost to the taxpayer not in excess of $100
which is awarded to an employee by reason of length of service or for safety achievement.
(2) Special rules. (A) In the case of a gift by partnership, the limitation contained in paragraph (1) shall apply
to the partnership as well as to each member thereof.
(B) For purposes of paragraph (1), a husband and wife shall be treated as one taxpayer.
302
See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
303 Carter,. 453 F.2d 65.
304palm Beach, 476 F.2d 1343.
303Section 274(b) did not preclude the employer's deduction in Bank of Palm Beach because the payment
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The argument that a payment should not be simultaneously excluded by

the payee and deducted by the payor has been made on two levels. First, a payment made primarily for business purposes, and therefore deductible by the
donor, 0 6 by definition is not made out of "detached and disinterested generosi-

ty" as required by Duberstein for excludability by the recipient. 0 7 Second, on
a policy level, if the donor is allowed a deduction for a payment that the donee
is not required to include in gross income, the result is an unacceptable "double benefit." 30 8 While the enactment of section 274(b) addressed the policy concerns, it exacerbated the uncertainty over the meaning of the Duberstein standard.
The general rule of section 274(b) is that a taxpayer making "business gifts"

may claim a deduction for such gifts only to the extent of $25 per donee per
year, assuming the "gifts" otherwise meet the requirements for deductibility

set forth in section 162.309 A higher limit, $100, was enacted for gifts "of tangible personal property ...

awarded to an employee by reason of length of ser-

vice or safety achievement." 3 10 The limitations of section 274(b) apply to "any
item excludable from gross income of the recipient under section 102. .

,, 311

By imposing a limit on the donor's ability to deduct gifts that are excludable
from the recipient's gross income, Congress resolved, to an extent, the "double benefit" policy dilemma.3 12 At the same time, however, Congress implicit-

ly recognized the possibility that a payment can be both deductible as a business
expense and excludable as a gift.313 Absent such a possibility, the limitations
of section 274(b) would never be triggered. In fact, commentators have asserted

that section 274(b) is superfluous because it is logically impossible for a payment to meet both the Duberstein standard for excludability and the requirements
was made before 1962. 476 F.2d at 1345. Cf. Jamie L. Abdella, supra note 294, a case arising out of
a 1976 payment. The Tax Court held that the payment was excludable from the employee's gross income
as a gift even though the employer had deducted it as compensation, stating that "(t)he fact that the payors
improperly claimed deductions should not preclude exclusion of the payment from the recipient's income
as a gift... " T.C. Memo (P-H) at 83-2502.
306

See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
3°TSee supra text accompanying note 11.
30See supra Shaviro accompanying note 55.
309See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
31 Section 274(b)(1)(C), Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Conference Committee Report states that
(i)t is a common practice of many employers to give such items as pins or watches to employees
upon their completion of a specified number of years of satisfactory employment or in recognition
of some safety achievement. Your committee felt that gifts for these purposes which serve to strengthen
the relationship between business and its employees should not be discouraged by the tax law. Conf.
Rept. No. 2508, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., 108 Cong. Rec. 21, 742 (1962).
3 11
Section 274(b)(1), supra note 301.
312
See supra text accompanying note 308.
313 According to the Ways and Means Committee Report, the enactment of section 274(b) was not intended
to change existing law on whether particular transfers were excludable from the recipient's gross income
as gifts. H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405, at 423-24. The Finance
Committee Report contains similar language, but one author has observed that the exceptions for display
racks, advertising item, and employee achievement awards added by the Committee betray a fundamental
misunderstanding of the scope of section 102. Shaviro, supra note 55 at 266.

1988]

TAX TREATMENT OF GIFTS TO EMPLOYEES

for deductibility as a business expense? 1 4 Assuming that Congress would not
enact a superfluous statute, the $25 (or $100) per donee deduction allowed by
section 274(b) can be rationalized as a legislative condonation of taxpayer practice, even though that practice departs from correct theory.31 5 Only three years
prior to the enactment of section 274(b), the Service had ruled that the value
of "merchandise of... nominal value, distributed by an employer to an employee
at Christmas, or a comparable holiday" could be deducted by the employer
as a business expense and excluded from gross income by the employee as a
gift." 31 6 While section 274(b) is somewhat broader in scope than the "Christmas
turkey" ruling, it certainly is not inconsistent in principle.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 dramatically liberalized the limitations of section 274(b) applicable to gifts of tangible personal property to
employees. The maximum allowable deduction was increased from $100 to
$400,3 17 and the language of the statute was changed to allow a $400 deduction
even if the total cost of the "gift" exceeds $400.318 More significantly, the statute
was amended to allow a deduction of up to $400 for tangible personal property
awarded to an employee by reason of "productivity." 31 9 The 1981 amendments
also added a higher $1,600 per donee deduction limit for property awarded under
a "permanent, written plan or program of the (employer) which does not
discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees
as to eligibility or benefits," provided that the average award under such plan
does not exceed $400.32 0
While the increase in the deduction limit from $100 to $400 can be attributed to inflation,321 the other changes caused considerable consternation .322
Since the limitations of 274(b) never come into play unless the transfer is a
gift under section 102,323 the inescapable implication was that transfers of the
type described in section 274(b)(3) could, at least in some circumstances, be
excludable gifts. 324 The possibility that an employee could exclude, under section 102, $1,600 worth of property received from her employer under a written
plan for rewarding productivity stretches the Duberstein standard beyond the
breaking point. It is not surprising that the 1981 amendments to section 274(b)
3

14Willis and Hawley, supra note 50, at 924.
5

" For a discussion of taxpayer practice in reporting such items, see Shaviro, supra note 55, at 243-246.
t6

a Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
3"Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No., 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 265 (1981).
3181d.
31910d
.

320

321

Id.

See Staff of Jt. Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 179-180, cited in S. Rep. No. 169, Vol. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 771 n.4 (1984).
322
See Shaviro, supra note 55, at 271-73, and Willis and Hawley, supra note 50, at 926-31.
323
See supra text accompanying note 311.
324
See supra notes 313-315 and accompanying text.
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engendered a flurry of debate over the applicability of section 102 to recipients
of "qualified plan awards." 325 Various "experts," 326 as well as two senators
who were the initial proponents of more liberal deduction limits for qualified
plan awards,327 maintained that "congressional intent ... was that the awards
be tax free to employees." 3 28 This position is questionable at best in light of
a statement in the General Explanation that "(t)he (1981) Act does not change
prior law as to whether amounts received by an employee constitute taxable
compensation or a gift." 329
Since the original enactment of section 274(b) in 1962, the Service and
the Treasury have steadfastly maintained that it has no effect on the question

of whether a particular transfer is a gift for purposes of section 102.330 The
Service reiterated this position in a News Release issued after the enactment
of the 1981 changes, stating that the value of a qualified plan award must be
included in the employee's income "(u)nless it can be shown that the award
was given because of the employer's detached generosity and in no way
represented compensation for services. .... ,331 The Release observes that "(a)
number of newspaper stories" commenting on the 1981 legislation "have er-

roneously concluded that all such awards are tax free to employees."

332

In 1984, as a result of "disagreements .. .between some taxpayers and
the IRS over whether . . . employee awards for length of service, safety, or

productivity qualify for exclusion from gross income under section 102 as
gifts" 333 the Senate Finance Committee proposed, and the full Senate approved,
a new statutory exclusion from gross income for "employee achievement

awards."

114

The proposed exclusion would have applied to "watch(es), clock(s), or other
timepiece(s), . . .emblematic jewelry or ring(s) . . .custom designed and
manufactured to identify or symbolize the awarding employer or the achievement being recognized," and, "to the extent provided in regulations," items
325Under the 1981 amendments, the higher $1600 limit applied to "qualified plan awards." Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, § 265(b), adding Code § 274(b)(3).
326
The opinions of these "experts" appeared in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Willis
and Hawley, supra note 50, at 929.
327
"Senators Gan and Chaffee publicly maintained that Congress intended the awards to be tax-free to
employees." Id.
328
ld. at page 927, n.112.
329 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
at 179, n.l. Similar observations appear in various proposals leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
See infra notes 356-57, note 364 and accompanying text.
133See, e.g., Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.274-3(b)(2) (1963), which states, in part, that "(t)he fact that ... items
are expected from the applicability of this section has no effect in determining whether the value of such
items is includible in the gross income of the recipient."
331
Internal Revenue News Release IR 81-138, STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 16258 (Dec. 21, 1981).
332/d.

333S. Rep. No. 169, Vol. 1,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 771 (1984).
334
1d. at 772-74.
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"of a type traditionally used" to make retirement or employee achievement
awards.335 Proposed section 74(c) would have excluded the value of such items
from the recipient's gross income, up to certain dollar limitations, provided
the items were awarded in recognition of "length of service (including retirement), productivity, and safety achievement." 3 36 The proposed statute would
have specifically included the value of such items in gross income to the extent
such value exceeded the dollar limitations. 3 37 While the proposed rules of exclusion and inclusion would have applied only to "qualified employee achievement award(s),' 338 the accompanying Committee Report states that "(e)xcept
to the extent that the new exclusion specifically applies, any amount of an
employee award (whether or not satisfying the definition of an employee achievement award) is includible in the employee's gross income under section 61, and
is not excludible under . . . section 102 (gifts)." 339
The proposed dollar limitations were based on the deduction limits of section 274, which would have been revised under the Senate's proposal. Generally,
the existing $400 and $1,600 limits would have been liberalized to allow a deduction for awards to a single employee aggregating $4,800 in a single year ($1,600
for length of service, $1,600 for productivity, and $1,600 for safety achievement) .340 More significantly, the Senate's proposal would have moved the limits
on the deductibility of employee achievement awards from section 274(b) to
new subsection 274(k).341 By virtue of this change, the applicability of the limits
would not have depended upon excludability by the recipient under section 102,
thus removing any implication that such awards could be excludable gifts. 342
The Senate's proposal was dropped in conference. 343 Nevertheless, the tax
legislation passed by Congress in 1984 did address gifts to employees; albeit
indirectly. Section 61 of the Code, which defines gross income, was amended
3 44
to include a specific reference to "fringe benefits" as taxable compensation.
The Ways and Means Committee Report, quoting a Supreme Court opinion,
states that gross income includes "any economic or financial benefit conferred
on the employee as compensation." 345 As part of the same act, Congress add33 5
336

Id.
1d.

337Id.

3381d.

339 1d. at 773.
340

1Id.

341
H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Sec. 828(b) (as passed by the Senate, 130 Cong. Rec. S5973 (daily

ed. May 17, 1984).
342
See supra notes 322-32 and accompanying text.
343
H.R. Rep. 98-861, 1984-3 C.B. Vol. 1 at 433-34.
344
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, Sec. 531(c).
34
5H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1166, reprintedin 1984-3 CB Vol. 2 (quoting Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. at 181).
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ed new code section 132, which specifically excludes certain fringe benefits
from gross income. The Committee Reports point out that any fringe benefit
not excluded under either section 132 or "another statutory fringe benefit provision" is includable in the employee's gross income. 346 One author has observed
that the 1984 changes "leave little room for disputing that employee awards
should be included in the recipient's taxable income

.

. , unless provided out

of detached and disinterested generosity." 347 This reasoning appears persuasive,
3 48
assuming the term "fringe benefit" is read to include employee awards.
Moreover, the language in the Committee Reports seems to imply that any item
49
that is a "fringe benefit" is not excludable as a gift under section 102.1
As enacted in 1984, section 132 excludes from gross income four main
categories of benefits.350 The category potentially applicable to "gifts" to
employees is the "de minimis fringe'" which is defined by section 132(e) as
''any property or service the value of which is (after taking into account the
frequency with which similar fringes are provided by the employer to the
employer's employees) so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or
administratively impracticable." 35' According to the Committee Reports, "traditional holiday gifts (to employees) of property with a low fair market value"
3 52
are excludable from the recipients' gross income as de minimis fringes.
V.

THE TAX REFORM ACT OF

1986

On November 27, 1984, the Treasury Department submitted its report to
353
the president, titled Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth.
That report proposed a denial of gift treatment for "all employee awards of
tangible personal property." 354 The report explained that "(t)he on-going business
relationship between an employer and an employee is generally inconsistent
with the disinterest necessary to establish a gift for tax purposes," adding an
346

1d. at 1169.
Shaviro, supra note 55, at 274-5.
34
1See id.
347

349

See supra text accompanying note 346.
I.R.C. § 132 provides an exclusion for no-additional-cost services, qualified employee discounts, working condition fringes, and de minimis fringes. I.R.C. § 132(b) defines no additional cost service as a service the employer sells to customers and allows employees to use for free, provided no additional cost
is incurred by the employer. The most familiar example of a no-additional-cost service is free travel on
a space-available basis for airline employees. A qualified employee discount, as defined in § 132(c), is
a discount on goods or services purchased by employees from an employer who offers such goods or
services to the general public. A working condition fringe, according to § 132(d), is a benefit provided
by the employer, the cost of which the employee could deduct as a business expense if she paid for it
herself. Under section 132(e), a de minimis fringe is a benefit of such small value that accounting for
it would be unreasonable or impracticable.
351I.R.C. § 132(e)(1).
3 52
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, supra note 345, at 1168.
35 0

311 United States Dep't of Treas., Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury
Department Report to the President (Nov. 1984). The Report is popularly referred to as "Treasury I."
354 1d. at Vol. 2, pages 45-6.
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observation that "in the unusual circumstances where an employee award truly
has no business motivation [and thus would be an excludable gift], it cannot
consistently be deducted as an ordinary and necessary expense of the employer's
business." 3 55 In describing the existing law, the report stated that, notwithstanding misperceptions to the contrary,3 56 "(t)he fact that an award does not exceed
the dollar limitations on deductions [imposed by section 274(b)] has no bear357
ing on whether the award constitutes taxable compensation to the employee."
A similar proposal, along with a virtually identical supporting explanation, appeared in the President's Tax Proposals to the Congressfor Fairness,
Growth and Simplicity, issued on May 29, 1985.358 The president's proposal,
however, extended to "all employee awards" rather than just "awards of tangible personal property." 359
The Tax Reform Bill of 1985,360 as passed by the House in December of
1985, followed the President's proposal by providing that section 102(a) "shall
not exclude from gross income any amount transferred by or for an employer
to, or for the benefit of, an employee." 36' Recognizing that the deduction limitations of section 274(b)(3) "have no application" if no transfer to an employee
can be excluded as a gift? 62 the House Bill proposed their repeal. 363
While the House Bill appeared to lay to rest any "uncertainty . ..con-

cerning the proper tax treatment of an employee award," 364 a footnote in the
Ways and Means Committee report leaves open the possibility of gift treatment for transfers from an (individual) employer to an employee "made exclusively for personal reasons (such as birthday presents) that are wholly
unrelated to an employment relationship." 365 The footnote adds, however, that
such a transfer "cannot give rise to a deduction under section 162 or section
212." 366 The report does point out that an award can be deductible by the
employer under section 162 and excludable by the employee as a de minrimis
fringe benefit under section 132(e), and sugg&sts that de minimis fringe benefit
treatment will apply, "under appropriate circumstances, to items preseuted to
355Id.

356 See supra notes 322-332 and accompanying text.
357
Treasury Dept. Rept., supra note 353, at Vol. 2 page 45.
358 The Proposal is popularly referred to as "Treasury II."
359President's Proposals, supra note 358, at 48. Perhaps the difference can be explained ty reading the
Treasury I proposal as an attempt to clarify the general non-excludability of employee achievement awards.
Treasury II, it would seem, addresses the issue more broadly.
360
H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
361H.R. 3838, supra note 360, Sec. 123(c)(1).
62
3 H. Rep. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1985).
363

H.R. 3838, supra note 360, Sec. 123(c)(2).
H. Rep. 426, supra note 362, at 105.
365 Id. at 106, n.5.
364

66

3

1d.
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employees upon retirement." 3 67 As an example of "appropriate circumstances,"
the report states that "in the case of an employee who has worked for the
employer for 25 years, a retirement gift of a gold watch may qualify as a de
minimis fringe benefit even though gold watches given throughout the period
3 68
of employment could not so qualify for exclusion."
The Senate Bill contained similar provisions amending section 102 and
repealing the limitations of section 274(b).369 The Senate Bill differed from the
House Bill, however, in that it added a new statutory exclusion, and corresponding deduction limitations, for employee achievement awards 70 The Senate provisions were adopted by the Conference Committee and ultimately become sec7
tions 102(c), 74(c), and 2740) of the Internal Revenue Code. '
New Code section 102(c) provides that section 102(a), which excludes gifts
from gross income, "shall not exclude from gross income any amount transferred
by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee." 372 Section 74(c)
provides a new exclusion for employee achievement awards. 37 3 The definition
of employee achievement award, as well as dollar limitations on the exclusion,
are keyed to new Code section 274(j), which places limits on the employer's
deduction for such awards. 37 4 The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act
states that "(e)xcept to the extent that the new section 74(c) exclusion or section 132(e)(1) applies, the fair market value of an employee award (whethei"
or not satisfying the definition of an employee achievement award) is includible in the employee's gross income under section 61." 375
Section 274(j)(3)(A) defines "employee achievement award" as "an item
of tangible personal property which is - (i) transferred by an employer to an
employee for length of service achievement or safety achievement, (ii) awarded as part of a meaningful presentation, and (iii) awarded under conditions and
circumstances that do not create a significant likelihood of the payment of disguised compensation." 3 76 Significantly, an award recognizing only productivi367
36 8

369

H. Rep. 426, supra note 362, at 106.
1d.

H.R. 3838, as passed by the Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 122.

0

37 1d.
37'Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 1, sec. 122.
372I.R.C. of 1986, sec. 102(c).
37 3

1.R.C. of 1986, sec. 74(c).

4

37 .R.C. of 1986, sec. 74(c)(1).
375
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 at 37.
376According to the General Explanation,

(t)he types of conditions and circumstances that are to be deemed to create a significant likelihood
of payment of disguised compensation include, for example, the making of employee awards at the
time of annual salary adjustments or as a substitute for a prior program of awarding cash bonuses,
or the providing of employee awards in a way that discriminates in favor of highly paid employees.
General Explanation, supra note 375 at 35, n.15.
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ty cannot be an employee achievement award.3 77 An award is treated as having
been given in recognition of length of service only if the recipient has been
an employee for more than five years, and an employee can receive only one
excludable length of service achievement award every five years.3 78 Safety
achievement awards do not include items "awarded to a manager, administrator,
clerical employee, or other professional employee," and only 10 percent of all
3 79
other employees can receive safety achievement awards during any taxable year.
For purposes of applying the limitations on length of service and safety achievement awards, awards excludable under section 132(e) as de minimis fringe
80
benefits are disregarded.1
Section 2740)(2) limits an employer's deduction for achievement awards
given to any single employee to $400 per year, but a higher limit ($1600) applies to awards given pursuant to a nondiscriminatory written plan if the average
award under such plan does not exceed $400.38 1 For purposes of determining
the average award under a plan, and presumably for purposes of determining
whether the dollar limitations have been exceeded, awards "of nominal value"
are disregarded.382
Section 74(c) excludes from an employee's gross income the value of any
employee achievement award to the extent that the cost of the award to the
employer does not exceed the deduction limits of section 2740). 383 If the cost
to the employer exceeds the limitations of section 274(j), the employee must
include in gross income the excess of the cost of the award over the deduction
limitation, or, if greater, the excess of the value of the award over the deduction limitation. 38 4 Section 74(c)(3) provides that the same exclusion limits apply to employees of tax exempt organizations, even though the deduction limitations of section 2740) would not apply to the employer.
VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE

1986

CHANGES

The addition of section 102(c) and the creation of a separate, non-gift exclusion for employee awards eliminates any argument that such awards are excludable as gifts.38 5 Moreover, as a general proposition, section 102(c) represents
377

Id. at 35, n.14.

378 1.R.C.
379
I.R.C.
38 0
I.R.C.
38 1
1.R.C.

of 1986, Sec.
of 1986, Sec.
of 1986, Sec.
of 1986, Sec.

274(j)(4)(B).
274(j)(4)(C).
274(j)(4)(B), (C)(i).
274(j)(2)(B).

312I.R.C. section 274(j)(3)(B)(ii) provides that the average cost of awards under a plan "shall be deter-

mined by including the entire cost of qualified plan awards, without taking into account awards of nominal
value." The purpose of excluding awards of nominal value apparently is to prevent the employer from
artificially lowering the average by giving away a large number of low cost items.
3

3

1I.R.C. § 74(c)(1).

84I.R.C. § 74(c)(2).
383
See supra notes 322-332 and accompanying text.
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congressional approval of the argument made by the Commissioner in Duberstein - i.e., that "payments by an employer to an employee, even though voluntary, ought, by and large, to be taxable." 386 The Ways and Means Committee
report recognizes in a footnote the possibility of an employer making an excludable gift to an employee if the transfer is made "exclusively for personal
reasons." 387 Such an exception would seem to be implicit. For example, it could
not be realistically argued that section 102(c) would render a mother's holiday
gift to her son taxable simply because the son happens to be a part-time employee
of his mother's business. A logical approach would seem to be that section
102(c) does not apply because the gift arises out of the parent-child relationship rather than the employer-employee relationship. A more vexing question
is whether section 102(c) denies gift treatment to a birthday present by an
employer to an employee if their relationship is purely professional. While the
Ways and Means Committee footnote specifically refers to birthday presents
as an example of "exclusively ...personal" gifts,3 88 the more appropriate answer
would seem to be that, absent some significant relationship other than that of
employer-employee, such "gifts" should be treated as taxable compensation
to the extent they are not excludable as de minimis fringe benefits under section 132(e). 38 9 In any event, the Ways and Means Committee Report clarifies
that an employer cannot claim a deduction for any transfer to an employee that
is sufficiently "personal" to qualify for exclusion under section 102.390
While section 102(c), together with the Committee Reports, goes a long
way toward resolving some uncertainties, it also creates new uncertainties. In
applying a limitation that applies to transfers by an "employer" to an "employee,"
the meaning of the words employer and employee will be critical. Section 102
does not define the words, and the only general definition applies, by its terms,
only for purposes of the employment tax.391 For purposes of other income tax
provisions using the words employer or employee, courts typically apply the
traditional common law tests for determining the existence of an employment
relationship.3 92 Presumably, similar principles will be applied in construing section 102(c).
A more troubling question is whether section 102(c) will preclude gift treatment in situations similar to that in the Bogardus case.393 A gift by shareholders
3 6
1 Duberstein,
387

363 U.S. 287.
H. Rep. 426, supra note 362, at 106, n.5.
388 ld.

3 9
1 See
390

supra text at note 352.
H. Rep. 426, supra note 362, at 106, n.5.
39 See I.R.C. section 3121(d).
392See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-547, 1954-2 CB 57, which states that the traditional common law test will be
applied to determine employment status for purposes of the exclusion provided for employee death benefits.
393
Supra note 282. See also Rhodes, Are Employer Bequests Income?, 36 Tax Notes 1305 (1987). Professor Rhodes suggests that the applicability of § 102(c) to bequests by employers to employees might
be uncertain because in such a situation there is no transfer "by an employer," as the employer is dead
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to an individual employed by a corporation appears, at first blush, to fall outside the scope of section 102(c) because there is no transfer by an employer
to an employee. (Quaere whether the transfer is a transfer for an employer to
an employee.) It is a relatively easy step, however, to re-cast the transaction
as a contribution to the corporation's capital by the shareholders followed by
a payment by the corporation to the employee, which clearly would be governed by section 102(c).94 It should be remembered, however, that the Supreme
Court relied heavily on the form of the transaction in Bogardus3 95 and did not
overrule Bogardus in Duberstein. 96 Similar distinctions based on form might
be applied to restrict the scope of section 102(c).
Other uncertainties are sure to arise under section 102(c). For example,
will section 102(c) prevent gift treatment for a present from a manager to a
staff member if both are employees of a large corporation? The applicability
of section 102(c) to payments to survivors of deceased employees - i.e., whether
such payments are "transfers . . . for the benefit of" the deceased employee
- will also have to be addressed.

From a policy standpoint, the exclusion for employee achievement awards
provided under section 74(c), under the limits of section 274(j), presents the
same "double benefit" problem that was inherent in previous section
274(b)(1)(C). 397 According to the Joint Committee's General Explanation, "Congress believed that the double income tax benefit of excludability and deductibility is acceptable for such types of employee achievement awards under rules
intended to prevent abuse and limit the scope of the double benefit." 398
New sections 74(c) and 274(j) create the potential for a double detriment
as well as double benefit. Employee Achievement Awards in excess of the limitations of section 2740)(2) result in gross income to the employee as well as a
denial of the employer's deduction.?99 It would seem that policy (as well as symmetry) might better be served by allowing an exclusion for the employee, but
and the relationship is terminated before the transfer takes place. Id. at 1306. Professor Rhodes does, however,
concede that such an analysis elevates form over substance. Id. Professor Rhodes also suggests that the
corporate veil might be pierced and § 102(c) invoked, in the case of a bequest by a shareholder to a corporate employee. Id.
394
Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which has been labeled the "fountainhead of learning"
on the business purpose and substance-over-form doctrines. BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14-169 (5th Ed. 1987).
195See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
6

39 Supra note 291.

397See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
39' General Explanation, supra note 375, at 33. The enactment of § 74(c) might be viewed as exacerbating
the double benefit problem, since it will "increase taxpayer exploitation of the double benefit, both by
eliminating the uncertainty and consequent risk and by stimulating publicity about the enactment of a
new tax 'break'." Shaviro, supra note 55, at 279.
399
1.R.C. §§ 74(c)(2) and 2740)(1). Presumably, the employer could easily avoid the deduction limitation
by providing the award in such a manner that it falls outside the definition of "employee achievement award"
set out in Code section 274(j)(3)(A).
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no deduction for the employer, up to the dollar limitations, and allowing a deduction but no exclusion for any amount in excess of the limitations.04 0
While cross references to section 132(e) were added to section 102 and
section 74,401 the 1986 Act did not modify the exclusion for de-minimis fringe
benefits. The Committee Reports do, however, discuss the scope of the exclusion provided by section 132(e). The Ways and Means Committee Report, the
Finance Committee Report, and the Joint Committee's General Explanation
all contain language "clarifying" that "the section 132(e) exclusion under present law for de minimis fringe benefits can apply to employee awards of low
value, including traditional awards (such as a gold watch) upon retirement after
lengthy service for an employer." 402 The General Explanation states that "no
serious potential for avoiding taxation on compensation arises from (such)
transfers," since "the award is not made in recognition of any particular achievement, relates to many years of employment, and does not reflect any expectation of or incentive for the recipient's rendering of future services." 403
To suggest that a gold watch might be "property ...the value of which
is ...so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively

impracticable" 404 is absurd. Valuable jewelry is not even remotely similar to
"occasional personal use of the company copying machine, occasional company cocktail parties or picnics for employees, . . .traditional holiday gifts
of property with a low fair market value, .. .and coffee and doughnuts fur-

nished to employees." 405 Particularly in view of the fact that section 74(c) potentially excludes retirement awards costing the employer as much as $1600,406
the application of section 132(e) to such awards seems inappropriate. It would
appear that Congress simply cannot admit to itself, or the taxpayers, that the
traditional gold retirement watch might be taxable. If the consensus of congressional opinion is that valuable retirement awards should not be taxed, Congress should have enacted a special, broader exclusion for retirement awards
instead of attempting to force such awards into a statutory pigeon hole too small
to accommodate them.

40

The employer might also be permitted to elect whether to deduct the cost of the award or allow the
employee to exclude it from gross income. Cf Code §§ 274(e)(2) and (3), which in effect allows employers
who reimburse entertainment expenses incurred by their employees to choose between having the deduction limitations of § 274(a) apply to themselves, or, by treating the reimbursements as compensation, avoiding
the limitations. If the reimbursements are treated as compensation, the employees, rather than the employer,
are subject to the limitations of § 274(a).
4'Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 1, section 122, adding new Code §§ 74(c)(4) and 102(c)(2).
40 2

H. Rep. 426, supra note 362, at 105; S.Rep. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986); General Explanation,
supra note 375, at 33.
403General Explanation, supra note 375, at 33.
40

4I.R.C. sec. 132(e)(1).
H. Conf. Rep. No. 861, supra note 345, at 1168.
06
.4 See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
40 5
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VII. CONCLUSION

Historically, uncertainty and inconsistency have characterized the tax treatment of gifts to employees. Courts, Congress, and the Service have all contributed to the confusion over whether an employee may exclude from gross
income the value of a gift from his employer, and whether the employer may
deduct the cost of such a gift as a business expense.
Gifts have been excluded from gross income by statute throughout the history
of the modern income tax, but Congress has never provided a definition of the
term "gift." 40 7 Perhaps predictably, early court decisions and Internal Revenue
Service pronouncements often adopted the traditional common law definition
- i.e. a transfer of property without consideration .408 The Supreme Court narrowed this definition in Commissionerv. Duberstein' 9 holding that an excludable
gift must proceed from "detached and disinterested generosity."

41 0

The Court

declined, however, to adopt objective criteria suggested by the Commissioner,
including the propositions that "payments by an employer to an employee, even
though voluntary, ought, by and large, to be taxable," and that "the concept
of a gift is inconsistent with a payment's being deductible as a business expense." 41 'I Even with the guidance provided in Duberstein, courts continued
4 2
to reach widely varying results in seemingly similar factual situations.
Shortly after Duberstein was decided, Congress enacted a dollar limitation on the deductibility of gifts as a business expense4' 3 This implied that
54
a gift might be both deductible by the donor and excludable by the donee '
Higher dollar limits for gifts to employees, which were subsequently liberalized
even further, exacerbated the confusion over the proper scope of the statutory
4t 5
exclusion for gifts.

By adopting a blanket rule that transfers to employees are not excludable
from the employees' gross income as gifts, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 resolves
much of the uncertainty that previously existed.4' 6 The Committee Reports suggest that the rule would not deny a taxpayers' exclusion of a "purely personal"
gift from an individual who happens to be the taxpayer's employer, cautioning
7
that such a gift would not be deductible by the employer as a business expense.4'
407

Nor does "specific and illuminating" legislative history exist. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 284.

408E.g. O.D. 1017, 5 C.B. 101.
40 9
410
411

Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278.
1d. at 285.

Id. at 287.
2See supra text accompanying notes 100-153 and 206-299.
413
Supra note 301.
4 14
Supra note 313 and accompanying text.
41
1Supra notes 322-332 and accompanying text.
4 16
I.R.C. § 102(c), supra note 372.
4"Supra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
41
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Ironically, Congress has adopted two of the criteria that the Supreme Court
declined to embrace in Duberstein I 8 In view of the intervening twenty-six years

of confusion, the old saw "better late than never" seems particularly appropriate.

41
1Supra

notes 32-37 and accompanying text.

PAC CONTRIBUTIONS AND EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX
RATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
by
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a great deal of concern has been expressed that many corporations have not been paying their "fair share" of federal taxes. Especially
troublesome is the fact that some profitable large corporations have been able
to avoid paying corporate income taxes altogether. For example, according to
a recent study by Citizens for Tax Justice, Boeing, ITT, General Dynamics,
Transamerica, First Executive Corp., Mitchell Energy & Development, Greyhound, Grumman, and Lockheed successfully zeroed-out their respective income
tax liabilities or received tax rebates in every year from 1981 through 1984.1
It is commonly asserted that such large corporations have used political
influence to secure special tax benefits to reduce their respective tax liabilities.
The present study investigates whether, in fact, there is a relationship between
corporate political influence and corporate tax liabilities. Specifically, this study
examines the relationship between corporate political action committee (PAC)
contributions made during the 1983-1984 election cycle and the effective corporate tax rates imposed on the related corporations in 1985.
BACKGROUND

Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended,2 labor
unions, corporations, trade associations, and certain professional and membership organizations may establish and finance "connected" political committees to support candidates for federal office.3 In recent years, such political action
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University; M.A.
(Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George
Washington University. The author wishes to thank Professor Arthur D. Cassill of the University of North
Carolina at Greensboro and University of Oklahoma graduate student Lani Lee Malysa for reviewing an
earlier draft. The author also wishes to thank Federal Election Commission Supervisory Statistician Robert
Biersack and University of Oklahoma graduate student Bob Schull for their technical assistance.
ISee R.S. McIntyre & D. Wilhelm, Citizens for Tax Justice, Corporate Taxpayers & Corporate Freeloaders:
Four Years of Continuing, Legalized Tax Avoidance by America's Largest Corporations 1981-1984, at 3
(1985)[hereinafter cited as Citizens for Tax Justice].
22 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq (Supp. 1987). The principal federal election campaign laws resulted from the
following Acts: Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971); Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976); and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. Law.
No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979).
3Such committees are allowed to solicit voluntary contributions from persons related to their sponsors.
The PACs, themselves, may then contribute as much as $5,000 for each primary or general election to
a candidate for federal elective office. There is no overall limitation on the amount that a PAC can contribute to all candidates. PACs and candidates for federal office are required to file periodic reports with
the Federal Election Commission.

